Anopheles spp.) female mosquitoes were captured by a Mosquito Magnet trap at Daeseongdong, a small village adjacent to the military demarcation line (center of the demilitarized zone) in northern Gyeonggi Province, Republic of Korea (ROK). Culicine mosquitoes were identiÞed to species, placed in pools of up to 30 mosquitoes each, and screened for ßavivirus using a SYBR Green I-based real-time polymerase chain reaction. In total, 51/660 pools positive for ßaviviruses and conÞrmed by DNA sequencing of the NS5 region, were positive for Japanese encephalitis virus (family Flaviviridae, genus Flavivirus, JEV) (50 Culex tritaeniorhynchus Giles and one Culex bitaeniorhynchus Giles). The JEV maximum likelihood estimations (MLEs) (estimated number of viral RNA-positive mosquitoes per 1,000) for Cx. tritaeniorhynchus and Cx. bitaeniorhynchus were 9.7 and 0.9, respectively. This is the Þrst report of a Cx. bitaeniorhynchus positive for JEV in the ROK. JEV is a local civilian and military health threat and a signiÞcant concern for nonimmune (unvaccinated) U.S. soldiers, civilians, and family members deployed to the ROK.
ated in 1967 for school-age children and expanded annually until all school-age children were included into the program by 1971. Over the past 2 decades, there have been zero to seven cases of JE reported annually, with the exception of an outbreak of 26 JE cases (six deaths) among ROK civilians in 2010; an approximately fourfold increase compared with recent years (Sohn 2000 , K-CDC 2010 .
The Entomology Section, Þfth Medical Detachment (MED DET), Multifunctional Medical Battalion (MMB), and the Force Health Protection and Preventive Medicine, 65th Medical Brigade (MED BDE), coordinates with the Korea National Institute of Health (K-NIH) and Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (K-CDC) to obtain historical and current data for disease incidence among ROK populations relative to JE surveillance, which provides a historical accounting of JEV infection rates in vector mosquito populations at U.S. military installations and training sites in the ROK (Turell et al. 2003 , Kim et al. 2007 .
Very limited information regarding the epidemiology of JE is available from the Democratic PeopleÕs Republic of Korea (DPRK). Daeseongdong is the only Korean village within the 4-km-wide demilitarized zone (DMZ) that separates the ROK from the DPRK (Fig. 1) . It is located 0.5 km south of Panmunjeom, where the Joint Security Area (JSA) is located, and 0.5 km east of the military demarcation line (MDL). It is well situated to investigate vector populations and associated zoonotic and human diseases circulating within the DMZ, and perhaps reßects on mosquitoborne disease risks in the DPRK. However, as much of the DMZ consists of unmanaged lands, unlike that of the ROK or the DPRK due to extensive agriculture in those countries; it may primarily reßect the zoonotic cycle and distribution of JEV and other mosquitoborne pathogens only within the DMZ. These studies were conducted to identify the relative seasonal abundance of Cx. tritaeniorhynchus and other culicines, vector potential based on infection rates, and related health threats to UN, U.S., and ROK communities residing at Panmunjeom and Daeseongdong.
Materials and Methods
Collection Site. Mosquitoes were collected along the western perimeter of Daeseongdong (37.94081Њ N, 126 .67706Њ E), a small village in the DMZ, Ϸ500 m east of the MDL, Josan-ri, Gunnae-myeon, Paju-si, Gyeonggi Province, ROK (Fig. 1) . Daeseongdong is south of Panmunjeom and the JSA and the only civilian village within the DMZ, with Ϸ200 residents. The surrounding area within the DMZ, which is not under wetland rice, Oryza sativa L., farming, consists of forested hills and low-lying unmanaged grasslands (abandoned rice paddies since the end of the Korean War) that ßood during rains.
Mosquito Collection. Adult mosquitoes were collected continuously at 3Ð7-d intervals from 20 July through 21 October 2010 by using a Mosquito Magnet (Pro model, American Biophysics Corp., Greenwich, RI) trap. Mosquitoes were removed from the trap, placed in a Styrofoam cooler containing wet ice, and transported to the Þfth MED DET, 168th MMB, 65th MED BDE, located at Yongsan Army Garrison, Seoul, ROK, where culicine mosquitoes were identiÞed to species according to Tanaka et al. (1979) and Lee (1998) . Culicine mosquitoes were pooled by species (1Ð30 per pool) and transferred to 2-ml cryovials where they were frozen at Ϫ70ЊC until transported on dry ice to the U.S. Army Medical Command-Armed Forces Research Institute of Medical Science at Bangkok, Thailand, where they were assayed for JEV.
JE Viral RNA Detection.RNA Extraction. Mosquito pools were homogenized in 750 l of RPMI 1640 medium with TissueLyser II (QIAGEN, Valencia, CA). The homogenate was centrifuged at 12,000 rpm for 10 min at 4ЊC to eliminate the debris, and 250 l of the supernatant was subjected to ßavivirus RNA detection. The remaining homogenate was maintained at Ϫ70ЊC for future use. Total RNA was extracted from mosquito homogenates using TRIzol reagent (Invitrogen, Carlsbad, CA) according to manufacturerÕs instruction. In addition, 50 g/ml glycogen (Sigma-Aldrich, St. Louis, MO) was added during RNA precipitation to enhance nucleic acid precipitation. Finally, the RNA pellet was resuspended in 50 l of RNase-free water containing 10 U of RNasinPlus RNase inhibitor (Promega, Madison, WI).
cDNA Synthesis. First-strand cDNA synthesis using random hexamers for two steps real-time polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) assay was carried out according to the SuperScript III (Invitrogen) manufacturerÕs protocol.
Flavivirus Detection by RT-PCR Assay. Flavivirus detection was performed by RT-PCR assay using the chromo4 RT-PCR detector (Bio-Rad Laboratories, Hercules, CA). The ßavivirus consensus primers, mFU1 and CFD2, were designed based on the most conserved domain of the ßavivirus NS5 region as described previously by Kuno et al. (1998) . Dengue virus serotype 4-inoculated Aedes aegypti (L.) and uninfected mosquitoes were included in every experimental run as positive and negative controls, respectively, as well as nontemplate controls. The RT-PCR reaction was carried out using platinum SYBR Green qPCR SuperMix-UDG (Invitrogen) in accordance with the manufacturerÕs protocol. The ßavivirus positive samples were further tested for the presence of JEV by using two assays; the one step RT-PCR assay (QuantiTect Probe RT-PCR kit, QIAGEN, Hilden, Germany) using mFU1 and CFD2 primers and 5-carboxyßuoresceinÐlabeled JEV-speciÞc probe (Chao et al. 2007 ) and RT-PCR assay (platinum SYBR Green qPCR SuperMix-UDG, Invitrogen) using the JEV-speciÞc primers JEF and JER, which speciÞcally bind to the JEV-NS3 region as described by Santhosh et al. (2007) . Samples that generated a detectable ßuorescence signal by both assays were determined as JEV positive. The ampliÞcation product from the RT-PCR reaction by using mFU1 and CFD2 primers was sequenced for JEV DNA sequence conÞrmation.
DNA Sequencing and Analysis. The PCR products were sent to AITbiotech (Singapore) for sequencing with mFU1 and CFD2 primers. The obtained DNA sequences were analyzed for DNA sequence identity against the sequence database in GenBank by using the National Center for Biotechnology Information BLAST program.
Results and Discussion
The DMZ is a 248-by 4-km mined and heavily fortiÞed zone that divides the Korean peninsula across the 38th parallel and which serves as an armistice buffer zone between the ROK and the DPRK. It is unpopulated, with the exception of Daeseongdong, a centrally located small farming village within the DMZ with Ϸ200 residents (Strickman et al. 2000 ; Fig. 1 ). Panmunjeom and JSA, where meetings are held between the ROK and DPRK governments, is Ϸ0.5 km from Daeseongdong and located along the southernmost border of the DMZ. Warrior Base, a U.S. military training site complex, and Tongilchon, a small farming village, are located Ϸ3 km south of Panmunjeom and north of the Imjin River. The nearest large settlements are Munsan-eup, Paju-si (10 km to the southeast) and Gaeseong (10 km to the northwest) in the ROK and DPRK, respectively. Except for Daeseongdong and associated farming activities (rice and two beef farms), the DMZ consists of forested hills and mountains and low-lying unmanaged grasslands (abandoned rice paddies), which form unmanaged impoundments and pools of water, especially during the rainy season.
In total, 22,846 mosquitoes, Anopheles spp. (5,053) and culicines (17,793), which comprised four genera and 10 species, were collected at Daeseongdong from 20 July to 21 October 2010 (88 trap-nights) ( cate that Ϸ20 times as many Cx. tritaeniorhynchus were collected using an unbaited Mosquito Magnet than in human landing collections (T.A.K., unpublished data). Therefore, although large numbers of Cx. tritaeniorhynchus are collected by Mosquito Magnets, the numbers may overestimate JEV risks.
Of 660 pools of 17,793 culicine mosquitoes, 51 pools (7.7%) were positive for ßaviviruses. JEV was detected in 50/207 (24.2%) pools of Cx. tritaeniorhynchus and 1/45 (2.2%) pools of Cx. bitaeniorhynchus, whereas all other culicine species were negative for JEV (Table  1) . The overall JEV maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) (estimated number of viral RNA-positive mosquitoes per 1,000) for Cx. tritaeniorhynchus was relatively high (9.7). MLE was calculated using PooledInfRate (Biggerstaff, CDC, www.cdc.gov/ncidod/ dvbid/westnile/software.htm). Previous reports have shown that the annual MFIR [(number of positive pools/number of female mosquitoes) ϫ 1,000] of JEV from Cx. tritaeniorhynchus in the ROK ranged from 0.11 to 0.31 (1982Ð1986) , 3.27 (2000 near the DMZ) (Turell et al. 2003) , and 0.31Ð 0.49 (2002Ð2004) (Kim et al. 2007 ). MFIR estimates the lower bound of the infection rate, whereas MLE estimates infection rate itself (Gu et al. 2003 (Gu et al. , 2004 . MLE takes into account the number of pools, number of positive pools, and variation in pool size thereby relaxing the assumption of MFIR that only one infected mosquito exists in a positive pool and therefore is a more accurate measure of infection rate (Gu et al. 2003 (Gu et al. , 2004 .
Cx. tritaeniorhynchus comprised 33.2% of all female mosquitoes collected from the Mosquito Magnet trap. Relatively low numbers of Cx. tritaeniorhynchus were collected from July, when trapping was initiated, through August, but sharply increased during September. Normally, heavy rains subside after the hot and wet monsoon season, but during 2010, they continued through much of September, increasing the potential for ßooding of low-lying grass habitats, which were conducive to breeding large populations of Cx. tritaeniorhynchus during the extended wet season. The highest daily trap index, recorded on 21 September was 678.3. Thereafter, trap indices sharply decreased to 1.9 Ð35.3 during the fourth week of September and until the end of the trapping season in October with the onset of earlier than usual cooler temperatures (Table 2; Fig. 2) .
JEV positive Cx. tritaeniorhynchus were Þrst observed on 31 August (MLE 25.3). The MLE ßuctuated between 7.3 and 13.1 during the collection dates in September. On 5 October, the MLE increased to 28.0 and was followed by a slight decline to 17.8 on 13 October and 0 on 21 October. Few Cx. tritaeniorhynchus were collected during the second half of October, and none were positive for JEV (Fig. 2) . One Cx. bitaeniorhynchus pool (collected on 8 September) was positive for JEV, and although this is the Þrst report in the ROK, it previously had been incriminated as a vector in other areas of Southeast Asia (Banerjee et al. 1978 , Vythilingam et al. 1995 ; Table 1 ).
JEV, a mosquito-borne arbovirus, is a major public health threat throughout much of Asia and is the leading cause of viral encephalitis worldwide (Okumo 1978, Burke and Leake 1988, Tsai 1990 ). Historically, even though it is estimated that only Ϸ1/25Ð1/1,000 infections result in clinical illness, JEV resulted in periodic epidemics throughout its range and currently focal epidemics are frequent in countries that lack a comprehensive childhood vaccination program (Deuel et al. 1950 , Halstead and Russ 1962 , Halstead and Grosz 1962 , Grossmann et al. 1973 , Benenson et al. 1975 , Halstead 1987 , Tsai 1990 ). In 1967, the ROK government initiated a mandatory mass childhood immunization which was fully implemented in 1971. The program greatly decreased the incidence of reported JE cases and from 1984 through 2009, there were no outbreaks or epidemics among local Korean populations with only zero to seven cases reported annually (total 55 cases) and seven deaths (12.7%), whereas outbreaks continued to be reported in India, China, and other countries that do not have a comprehensive JEV vaccination program. Due to the mandatory childhood vaccination program and underreporting of asymptomatic to mild cases, the ofÞcial reporting of cases in the ROK signiÞcantly underestimates the JE health threat in the ROK (Tsai 1993) . In 2010, an outbreak of 26 JE cases with six deaths (23.1%) occurred among ROK civilians, approximately a 10-fold increase over the last 26 yr (55 cases), which corresponded to an extended rainy season and the high rate of JEV detected in Cx. tritaeniorhynchus and Cx. bi- taeniorhynchus, as well as JEV positive Cx. tritaeniorhynchus in other parts of the ROK (K-CDC 2010; R.T., unpublished data). The extended rainy season likely resulted in 1) increased populations of Cx. tritaeniorhynchus from ßooding of low-lying grass habitats in the DMZ, as well as other areas of the ROK; 2) increased populations of local and migratory (SeptemberÐOctober) water fowl, the primary reservoir of JEV (Mitamura et al. 1937 (Mitamura et al. , 1938 ; 3) increased potential for infections among secondary vectors (i.e., Cx. bitaeniorhynchus); 4) increased transmission to wild pigs (amplifying host of JEV), which are abundant throughout the DMZ (Wada 1972) ; and 5) increased potential for human transmission, which was also observed in the widely distributed 2010 outbreak throughout the ROK.
Risks of JEV infections in the ROK are highly variable based on geographical distributions, seasonality, urbanization, farming practices, and nighttime periods of exposure. Travelers and soldiers deployed to JEV endemic areas of the world must be advised of JEV risks based on travel to rural areas, extended periods of residence during periods of transmission, outdoor activities (especially in the evening), and proximity to rice paddies or low-lying grass habitats, especially because many of the U.S. installations and military training sites in the ROK are surrounded by rice paddies and large numbers of Cx. tritaeniorhynchus are observed through monitoring by various trapping methods (Tsai 1990 , Turell et al. 2003 , Kim et al. 2007 ). Although there have been no reported JE cases among U.S. personnel over the last several decades, the risk of transmission (seroconversion) and corresponding disease risks are unknown. However, based on the Korean experience, it is likely that transmission occurs in U.S. populations, but either cases were asymptomatic, very mild, or were not evaluated for JEV infection. Therefore, areas where U.S. personal reside near rice paddies require increased vigilance and monitoring to ensure that U.S. populations use protective measures, i.e., use of repellents, wearing insecticide impregnated uniforms or other appropriate clothing when outdoors at night, to reduce mosquito bites and transmission of JEV in high-risk areas. Recommendation for immunization using U.S.-approved JEV vaccines may be warranted in addition to other personal preventive measures.
Disease and vector surveillance programs, such as for JEV, provide the U.S. Forces in the ROK with a more precise disease risk analysis, in addition to instituting vector control and disease reduction strategies. Unfortunately, these surveillance systems currently are not timely and are retrospective. However, these retrospective studies do provide for improved disease risk analysis and demonstrates the need for personnel and funding resources for improved health surveillance and development of strategies to mitigate disease risks. Furthermore, these U.S. preventive medicine assets, i.e., Medical Detachments, universities, Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center, must be augmented, when possible, with local Ministry of Health and university collaborations (i.e., the K-NIH and K-CDC) in the ROK to provide more timely analysis of information and effective protection for U.S. soldiers and civilians and their family members deployed to Korea.
